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ARGUMENT 
As discussed in Rappleye's opening appeal brief (and discussed herein), the trial 
court erred in its decision because (1) Johnson's claims of fraudulent transfer and 
constructive trust are barred by the statute of limitations, and (2) the trial court had no 
jurisdiction in the garnishment proceeding to adjudicate Hodges' assets when she was not a 
party to said proceeding. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO 
APPLY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO JOHNSON'S CLAIMS 
A, A Fundamental Flaw Permeating Johnson's Appeal Brief Regarding 
the Statute of Limitations Issue Is That Most of the Facts, Claims and 
Arguments Therein Are Irrelevant 
Rappleye's statute of limitations defense is very narrow and specific. It is simply 
that the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed (see. Appendix A) from Rappleye "was or 
could reasonably have been discovered"1 by Johnson at or before the February 1996 
bankruptcy trial.2 In support of this legal conclusion, Rappleye presented the undisputed 
excerpt from Rappleye's bankruptcy trial (which is quoted on pgs. 17-18 in Rappleye's 
1
 Utah's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, U.C.A. § 25-6-10(1) ("UFTA"). 
2
 It is undisputed that this deed is the fraudulent transfer Johnson requested the trial 
court to void and unwind. Once this transfer was unwound, the trial court concluded that 
Rappleye had 48% interest in the proceeds Hodges received from her sale of the Resort. It 
is these proceeds that ended up in her Fidelity Investment account, which Johnson attached. 
1 
Brief of Appellant).3 
Although Johnson briefly discusses this discrete issue, she also presents the Court 
with pages and pages of irrelevant facts, claims and arguments of Rappleye's supposed 
misrepresentations and concealment of his other assets in an effort to engender sympathy 
from the Court and to inject emotion and passion into the few legal issues on appeal.4 For 
3
 For the Court's convenience, the excerpt in question is attached to this brief as 
Appendix B. 
4
 Typical jury instructions mandate that the trier of fact conscientiously and 
dispassionately consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case. For 
example, MUJI 2.3 states, "This case must not be decided for or against anyone because 
you feel sorry for anyone or angry at anyone. It is your sworn duty to decide this case 
based on the facts and the law, without regard to sympathy, passion or prejudice." Surely 
the same applies to judges as well as juries. 
In the same vein, the Utah Supreme Court in Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care. 
748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987) stated that, "We have previously held that 'pleas plainly 
designed to elicit sympathy or to inspire passion or prejudice should not be allowed."5 
(Citation omitted). See also, State v. Truiiilo. 214 P.2d 626, 645 (Utah 1950) (holding that 
it "is the duty of the court to apply the law to the facts supported by the evidence"). Other 
jurisdictions have also articulated a judge's duty to dispassionately apply the law. In 
Commonwealth v. O'Neal 339 N.E.2d 676, 693 (Mass. 1975), the court held: 
No judge should ever be concerned with whether his decision will be popular or 
unpopular. He does his job always with complete awareness that. . . contemporary 
public emotions (no matter what their motivation), and personal philosophies are 
completely foreign and irrelevant to the exercise of his judicial power. This is the 
very essence of judicial duty — no less should be given and no more should be required. 
Finally, in United Traction Co. v. Monohan, 190 N.Y.S. 425, 426 (1921), the court held that 
"judges of the courts are chosen to deal dispassionately with all parties and to enforce the 
law with even-handed justice, protecting the rights of all under the law, the popular and the 
unpopular." 
2 
example, Johnson asserts facts about a partnership between Rappleye and Hodges, Rappleye 
concealing the Timpanogos Property, Rappleye and Hodges' temple marriage, Rappleye's 
letter of objection to the bankruptcy court, findings and conclusions of the bankruptcy 
court, Hodges' estate planning matters, Hodges and Rappleye's marital relationship, and 
their motor home and Suzuki Sidekick. Such facts might be used at trial as a strategy to 
engender sympathy from a jury for her cause, but said facts are simply irrelevant for the 
Court to determine if the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed was a fraudulent transfer. 
Put another way, if Johnson initially discovered the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim 
Deed, or could have reasonably discovered it, do such "badges of fraud" still stick to 
Rappleye? Such "badges of fraud" cannot erase or invalidate the fact that by the time of the 
February 1996 bankruptcy trial, Johnson had actually discovered (or could have reasonably 
discovered) the fraudulent transfer - the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. Once she 
discovered the Quit Claim Deed, the statute of limitations began running at that time.5 It 
did not stop running thereafter based on a new badge of fraud, and Johnson has presented 
the Court with no legal support allowing a court to toll the running of the statute of 
limitations after it had already started. 
Thus, once the Court wades through Johnson's sympathy-engendering fraud facts, 
5
 See e ^ Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Company. 857 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App. 
1993) (holding that "the running of the statute of limitation is tolled until the plaintiff 
discovers (or should have discovered) all of the facts that form the basis for the cause of 
action." 
3 
and focuses on the core statute of limitations issue - i.e. Johnson's discovery of the 
September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed - the Court will find that all else is irrelevant, 
extraneous, and included in the Brief of Appellee to prejudice the Court against Rappleye. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that Rappleye Fraudulently 
Concealed the September 17,1993 Quit Claim Deed6 
1. The Core Issue Regarding Rappleye's Statute of Limitations 
Defense is Whether Johnson Discovered Facts of the September 
17,1993 Quit Claim Deed Based on the Bankruptcy Excerpt 
The trial court found that Johnson proved fraudulent concealment.7 The trial court, 
however, did not specify that Johnson proved fraudulent concealment vis-a-vis the 
September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. As stated above, proof of Rappleye fraudulently 
concealing anything else is wholly irrelevant to Johnson's fraudulent transfer claim. Thus, 
the core issue to Rappleye's statute of limitations defense is: did Johnson discover, or 
could she have discovered, facts regarding the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed 
based on the bankruptcy excerpt? 
This narrowly-defined issue is shaped by Utah caselaw. First, the Court of Appeal 
must look solely at the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed because it is the undisputed 
6
 Based on the Court of Appeals' recent decision in Russell/Packard Development 
Inc. v. Carson, 78 P.3d 616 (Utah App. 2003), a discussion of the fraudulent concealment 
doctrine is appropriate in deciding this case. 
7
 Notably, the trial court has made no finding of fraudulent misrepresentation, 
fraudulent nondisclosure, or constructive fraud. Indeed, the claim at issue is one of 
fraudulent transfer (and the other issue is Johnson's constructive trust claim which is 
discussed below). 
4 
MUIILVH! Johnson's (rainliiliiil \ on\ c\«*nii */ rKnin " I In: (>Liiii(ifl nnhl phn, * lli.il MM 
defendant concealed the wrong and that as a result the plaintiff could not, with due 
diligence, have discovered his claim sooner.'" Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45. 52 fUtnh 
1996) (citation omitted), Ilie Berenda coun ICSUMUM UL ::. .-.,: ; : ., : 
of action" tl lat is concealed. Berenda,,. 91 1 P.2d at 53. In fact, in Russell/Packard 
Development, Inc. v. Carson, 78 P. 3d b \ o [ i iah \pr JX-M. ihi> Court recently held that "a 
threshold showing that [li-e pi«i..i,ni] *l-o ;.- ; AHH * dud L< ..h; notreasonal, :.a-. Known of 
the existence oj i i -1- iv.: • 
v ersion of the discove - *. ." 8 (citation omitted) (bolded emphasis added). 
Second, the Court mus- k«ou <»( ^ha* constitutes "discovery" of the fraudulently 
concealed September . . / ' . . . . . . . . ; , . . , m Smith v. Edwards, . : _ . - . ' 
.: ii;-.!, ov:> iH- - * .; :- * . * • / . ' /.• /v vvinui would have put an 
ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry which, if followed up, would have resulted in a 
discovery of the fraud, was equivalent to actual discovery.'" IdL at 270 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added} In Baldwin •». DUIH-J ^ ti*x d '-% * - "• « \* d 
that, "The means of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. A party who has opportunity of 
knowing the facts constituting the alleged fraud cannot be inactive and afterwards allege a 
8
 I his Court just decided Russell/Packard less than four months ago (on September 
18, 21303) - - approximately one month after R appleye filed his Brief of Appellant. 
5 
want of knowledge that arose by reason of his own laches and negligence.'" Id. at 1196 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). And in United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park 
City Co., 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993), the court held, '"All that is required [to trigger the 
statute of limitations] is . . . sufficient information to apprise [the plaintiffs of the 
underlying cause of action] so as to put them on notice to make further inquiry if they 
harbor doubts or questions' about the defendant's actions." LI at 889 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). "Under the concealment prong, . . . [t]he limitations period is postponed 
only by belated discovery of key facts and not by delayed discovery of legal theories." 
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah App. 1996) (emphasis 
added). Finally, "it is not necessary for a claimant to know every fact about his fraud claim 
before the statute begins to run." Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 1197. Thus, according to the above 
cases, Johnson has discovered the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed when she 
demonstrates "a knowledge of the facts," "has an opportunity of knowing the facts 
constituting the alleged fraud," or has sufficient information of the underlying cause of 
action. 
2. Applying the Above Caselaw to the Facts Surrounding the 
September 17,1993 Quit Claim Deed Yields No Fraudulent 
Concealment 
Johnson clearly had "a knowledge of the facts" or an "opportunity of knowing the 
facts" that constituted the "wrong" based on the 1996 bankruptcy trial excerpt (reprinted in 
6 
Appendix B) w herein Johnson 's attorney cross-exai nined R apple}/ e (with leading questions) 
about the specific owners of the Resort prior to Hodges (see. Appendix C), and the specific 
owners of the Resort who purchased it from Hodges . (See, Appendix D). As argued in the 
Brief of Appellant , there is no reasonai'-v < . . • . > , • : • • •, -. ;* , i id: *•..•> • 
inlormafion - the specific names of the owners of record of the Resort before and after 
Hodges - unless Johnson 's attorney had copies of the relevant deeds indicating Resort 
ownership - ^iu>: inch u-i:*... mu* .; .:*>;:I, ^ ,ti iuu\ the me^ns to nKaih liiv_ ueec:* .?i 
CP viic: • : : . i , ; f» . *:--.'- • ." •. "i ,.;«.^ .'.. . . ! v\ '• "• • :. means' 
to obtain H o d g e s ' deeds, one of which was the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed 
whereby Rappleye transferred his interest in \l\: Koso-* to Hodges. 9 
claiming that the excerpt in question "reveals only that Pla in t i f fs attorney knew the name 
of the person who sold the Branson Property to Hodges and the person to w h o m Hodges 
later sold ' II: ic exchai ige in no « ; • ay reveals 1 IOV or fi om j < 1 ic i n, Plai ntiff s attorney learned 
that information." (See, Brief of Appellee, pg, 27) (emphasis in original). How evei, 
Johnson offers the Court no alternative explanation as to how her attorney mysteriously 
knew- the chain of title of the resoi t tlii ough three coi lseci iti ve o > > i i "i s (i e Di i\ all IV lichel 
Investments (Duvall) to Hodges, and from Hodges to the Smiths). (See Appendices B and 
9
 The other Hodges ' deed is a Statutory Warranty Deed reflecting her changed name 
after her divorce from Rappleye. (See, Appendix E) . 
7 
D, respectfully). Even the trial court (after listening to the tape containing the excerpt in 
question, which Rappleye intends to play at oral arguments for this Court) acknowledged 
that Johnson "had copies of the deeds for sure" at or before the bankruptcy trial. (R at 
1451, pg. 151:9-10).10 
Johnson further attempts to distance herself from the bankruptcy excerpt by 
claiming that the excerpt fails to show Johnson "knew that i) Rappleye purchased Branson 
Property with Hodges; ii) that Rappleye had held title in the Branson Property jointly with 
Hodges; and/or iii) that Rappleye transferred his interest in the Branson Property to 
Hodges on September 17, 1993." (See, Brief of Johnson, pg. 27). However, this argument 
ignores the logical and reasonable conclusion that if Johnson had the January 4, 1993 
Warranty Deed by Corporation from Duvall to Hodges (see. Appendix B), she must have 
noticed that said deed transfers title of the Resort from Duvall to Hodges and "G. Bryce 
Rappleye." Surely, the sight of Rappleye's name on a quit claim deed recorded on the 
Resort should have been a fact sufficient enough to require Johnson to conduct further 
inquiry into Rappleye's interest in the Resort. Further, the deed transferring interest from 
Hodges to the Smiths makes no mention of Rappleye's name. (See, Appendix D). This 
fact, in conjunction with the Duvall-to-Hodges/Rappleye warranty deed (see. Appendix C), 
10
 This acknowledgment of course did not become a finding because counsel for 
Johnson drafted the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and the trial court 
signed off on them all without change, over Rappleye's objections. 
8 
should have at the very least excited Johnson's interest to find out the status of Rappleye's 
interest in the Resort, especially when she had a judgment of over $200,000 she had been 
trying to collect from Rappleye for almost two years, during which time Rappleye is 
claiming he has no assets. Again, Johnson need only have "a knowledge of facts which 
would have put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry which, if followed up, would have 
resulted in a discovery of the fraud," or in other words "sufficient information" to apprise 
Johnson of Rappleye's fraudulent transfer. Thus, the bankruptcy excerpt conclusively 
demonstrates that Johnson knew of the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed - the 
undisputed fraudulent transfer - or, at the very least, could have known about said quit claim 
deed. 
3. Johnson Has Alleged No Facts That Rappleye Fraudulently 
Concealed the September 17,1993 Quit Claim Deed 
Finally, Johnson provides the Court no facts of affirmative steps that Rappleye 
made to conceal the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. It is undisputed that said quit 
claim deed was publicly recorded. It is undisputed that said quit claim deed contains no 
aliases or fabricated names or corporate names so as to hide Rappleye's true name. 
Johnson has made no allegations to the contrary. Thus, Rappleye's fraudulent transfer was 
transparent for all to see via the recorded September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed which 
Johnson discovered or could have discovered according to the bankruptcy excerpt in 
question. 
9 
Contrast Johnson's allegations of fraudulent concealment of the September 17, 
1993 Quit Claim Deed with McConkie v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974) where the 
plaintiff claimed the defendant fraudulently concealed a mineral reservation of rights 
clause in certain recorded deeds of trust regarding property plaintiff purchased from 
defendant, thereby tolling the statute of limitations. In affirming the trial court, the 
McConkie court explained: 
The court below found that the plaintiffs had full opportunity to discover the 
reservations in the deeds when the deeds were delivered to Security Title Company 
and when they reviewed problems in the chain of title. That all of the 
circumstances existing at or about the time the deeds were recorded were such 
as to furnish full opportunity to the plaintiffs for the discovery of the mistake or 
fraud, if any existed. The court further found that more than eight years had elapsed 
since the time for reasonable inquiry on the part of the plaintiffs would have 
revealed the mistake or fraud to the time of filing their complaint. The trial court 
concluded that the claims of the plaintiffs are barred by the statutes of limitation 
above referred to. 
Id. at 802 (emphasis added). Furthermore, Freitag v. McGhie, 947 P.2d 1186 (Wash. 
1997) provides another example of a debtor claiming fraudulent concealment of a deed: "In 
this case, for instance, nothing on the instrument itself indicated a fraudulent transfer. . . . 
This transfer was to an insider, a family member, but the names were not the same and 
there was no indication of this relationship" Id. at 1190. In Freitag, the debtor gave a 
note to his aunt (with a different last name than debtor) as well as a deed of trust securing 
the note to his aunt that encumbered debtor's property, creating the facade that no equity 
existed in debtor's property for the creditor. IdL at 1187. The creditor later discovered the 
10 
relationship of the debtor to the trust deed holder (his aunt) and filed a successful 
fraudulent transfer action thereafter. LI 
In sum, based on the above facts (i.e. the bankruptcy court excerpt) applied to the 
above caselaw, Johnson discovered (or could have discovered) the September 17, 1993 
Quit Claim Deed thereby triggering the statute of limitations on her fraudulent transfer 
claim. Thus, this Court should follow the Utah Supreme Court's conclusion in Baldwin: 
"Lacking allegations that the debtor had concealed the deed effecting the fraudulent 
conveyance, we held [in Baldwin] that the creditors were on constructive notice of the 
conveyance, and therefor its fraudulent nature, because 'the means of knowledge were 
available' to the creditors." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 52 (citation omitted). The same exact 
result should apply to this appeal.11 
4. Johnson Should Have Searched for Property Upon Which to 
Execute Once She Obtained the Judgment From Her Divorce 
Action With Rappleye 
Not to be lost among Rappleye's statute of limitation's defense is the related 
defense that once Johnson obtained her 1994 judgment against Rappleye (in their divorce 
proceeding), as a matter of law, she should have searched for property of Rappleye's upon 
which to execute her judgment. As the court in Baldwin held: 
11
 Based on the above discussion, Johnson's common law two-pronged analysis (i.e. 
[1] prove fraudulent concealment, and then [2] prove Johnson acted reasonable) fails on its 
first prong. 
11 
After obtaining the judgment against Willard Wood, the Burtons should have 
searched for property upon which to levy. . . . Had a search been made, 
exercising reasonable diligence and proper prudence, it surely would have 
uncovered the transfer from Wood to his wife. Discovery of the transfer would 
then have sparked further inquiry on the part of the Burtons. If such inquiry had been 
pursued, the Burtons would have discovered facts surrounding the allegedly 
fraudulent conveyance. At the very least, discovery of the transfer should have 
incited suspicion of fraud. 
Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 1197 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Berenda court explained: 
[In Baldwin] [wje held that the creditors would have discovered the conveyance 
had they conducted a normal search of property upon which to levy when they 
received their judgment against the debtor. [Citation omitted]. Lacking 
allegations that the debtor had concealed the deed effecting the fraudulent 
conveyance, we held that the creditors were on constructive notice of the 
conveyance, and therefore its fraudulent nature, because Hhe means of 
knowledge were available9 to the creditors. 
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 52 (emphasis added). In sum, Johnson's fraudulent transfer claim is 
barred by the statute of limitations which began running at the time Johnson received a 
judgment against Rappleye in the Spring of 1994. At that time, she was on constructive 
notice to search for properly Rappleye owned upon which to levy her judgment. Johnson 
does not dispute this defense as it appears she did not address it in her Brief of Appellee. 
Accordingly, the trial court committed reversible error by failing to dismiss Johnson's 
claim pursuant to this defense. 
C. Johnson's Constructive Trust Claim is Also Barred by the Statute of 
Limitations 
As a back-up to her fraudulent transfer claim, Johnson also asserts a constructive 
12 
trust claim. Although the trial court did not rule on this claim, it nevertheless fails for the 
same statute of limitations reason as Johnson's fraudulent transfer claim (as set forth in 
Rappleye's introductory Brief of Appellant).12 
Johnson counters this argument with Nielsen v. Nielsen, WL 33249399 (Utah App.). 
Although Nielsen is distinguishable insofar as the Nielsen court tolled the statute of 
limitations because the Nielsen defendant failed to present any evidence to indicate the 
plaintiff had actual or constructive notice (i<l at 4), Nielsen is nevertheless a decision 
without a published opinion. Rule 4-508(1) of the Rules of Judicial Administration states 
that, "Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value and shall not 
be cited or used in the courts of this state,.. ." Thus Nielsen has no precedential value. 
In sum, Johnson's constructive trust claim is barred by the statute of limitations 
because Johnson discovered the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed, or could have 
discovered it, no later than the February 1996 bankruptcy trial. 
II. JOHNSON'S PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT 
Johnson includes two procedural arguments in her Brief of Appellee: (1) Rappleye 
should have ordered a complete transcript, but didn't, and (2) Rappleye failed to marshal the 
facts on appeal. As discussed below, both of these arguments are without merit. 
12
 In other words, Johnson probably had actual notice of the September 17, 1993 
Quit Claim Deed, but certainly had constructive notice of said deed. 
13 
A. Requesting the December 11, 2001 Hearing Transcript Was 
Unnecessary Because it Contains No Evidence Relevant to the 
September 17, 2003 Quit Claim Deed (Statute of Limitations Defense) 
and No Evidence Relevant to Rappleye's Jurisdiction Defense 
Johnson claims that Rappleye failed to file a statement of issues which is required 
under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure when only a partial transcript is 
requested. Johnson implies that Rappleye's submission of the transcript of only the March 
6, 2002 evidentiary hearing and not the December 12, 2001 hearing somehow omits 
evidence relevant to the findings or conclusions Rappleye challenges.13 However, not only 
does Johnson fail to state what evidence from the December 12, 2001 hearing she feels is 
relevant (in fact none of the exhibits attached to the Brief of Appellee were introduced as 
an exhibit at the December hearing), but she fails to state either how she is prejudiced by 
Rappleye ordering only a partial transcript (i.e. the transcript of the March 6, 2002 
hearing), and also fails to state the evidence from the December 12th hearing that is relevant 
to the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed (or relevant to Rappleye5s jurisdiction 
defense). As this Court stated in Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App. 
1989), Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure directs counsel to provide the 
appellate courts with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal. No relevant 
evidence was submitted at the December 12, 2001 hearing (at least that was not considered 
again at the March 6,2002 hearing). 
13
 The March 6, 2002 hearing was a continuance of the December 12, 2001 hearing. 
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Further, Rappleye included in his Docketing Statement all the relevant issues to be 
considered in this appeal. 
Finally, Rappleye stipulated with Johnson to give Johnson whatever time she needed 
to insert into the record on appeal whatever parts of the December 12, 2001 hearing. (See, 
Motion to Supplemental Record on Appeal and Stay the Briefing and Deadlines). Thus, 
Johnson certainly was not prejudiced, and because anything Johnson may have included in 
the record from the December 12, 2001 hearing is irrelevant to the issues in this appeal, 
the Court already has all the evidence in front of it to reverse the trial court below. 
Thus, this procedural argument by Johnson is without merit. 
B. Rappleye Marshaled All Evidence Relevant to the September 17,1993 
Quit Claim Deed 
Johnson's other procedural argument is that Rappleye supposedly failed to properly 
marshal evidence in support of the trial court's findings vis-a-vis his statute of limitations 
defense. In support of this claim, Johnson points this Court to five groups of facts that 
Rappleye supposedly failed to marshal. 
1. Facts Related to the Purchase of the Bronson Property (i.e. 
Resort) 
First, Johnson claims Rappleye should have marshaled facts related to the closing of 
the Branson Property (i.e. the Resort), including Rappleye's execution of the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract and the HUD Settlement Statement, and Rappleye's transfer of 
$144,000. (See, Brief of Appellee, pg. 39). However, Rappleye's execution of said 
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contract, the HUD statement, and the $144,000 are irrelevant to whether Johnson 
discovered, or could have discovered, the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. In other 
words, said evidence is irrelevant to Rappleye's statute of limitations defense and lack of 
jurisdiction defense. Not only is Rappleye not appealing those findings, but for purposes 
of this appeal, Rappleye does not dispute that he executed said contract and the HUD 
statement, and transferred $144,000 to purchase the Resort. 
2. Facts Related to the Time Line From June 15, 1993 to January 6, 
1994 
Second, Johnson claims Rappleye should have marshaled facts related to the 
Rappleye v. Rappleye appeal, the dates of Rappleye's and Hodges' divorce, remand trial 
and various hearings, as well as the Timpanogos Property transfer. (See, Brief of Appellee, 
pg. 39). Again, these findings are irrelevant to whether Johnson discovered, or could have 
discovered, the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. In other words, said evidence is 
irrelevant to Rappleye's statute of limitations defense and lack of jurisdiction defense. Not 
only is Rappleye not appealing those findings, but for purposes of this appeal, Rappleye 
does not dispute them. 
3. Facts Related to Rappleye's and Hodges' Divorce 
Third, Johnson claims Rappleye should have marshaled facts related to his and 
Hodges' divorce. Such facts, however, are irrelevant to whether Johnson did or could have 
discovered the September 17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. In other words, sadd evidence is 
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irrelevant to Rappleye's statute of limitations defense and lack of jurisdiction defense. Not 
only is Rappleye not appealing those findings, but for purposes of this appeal, Rappleye 
does not dispute them. 
4. Facts Related to Rappleye's Prior Sworn Testimony and 
Representations to Various Courts 
Fourth, Johnson claims Rappleye should have marshaled facts related to sworn 
testimony and representations Rappleye introduced to the trial court back in 1994 
regarding his divorce from Johnson, as well as the bankruptcy court. Such facts, however, 
are irrelevant as to whether Johnson discovered, or could have discovered, the September 
17, 1993 Quit Claim Deed. In other words, said evidence is irrelevant to Rappleye's statute 
of limitations defense and lack of jurisdiction defense. Not only is Rappleye not appealing 
those findings, but for purposes of this appeal, Rappleye does not dispute them. 
5. Facts Related to the 2001 Supplemental Proceeding, Writ of 
Execution, Motor Home and Suzuki Sidekick 
Perhaps most indicative of Johnson's overreaching on her procedural claim that 
Rappleye failed to marshal facts is her assertion that events in 2001 are somehow relevant 
to whether Johnson discovered, or could have discovered, the September 17, 1993 Quit 
Claim Deed. It cannot be disputed that such evidence is wholly irrelevant to Rappleye's 
statute of limitations defense and lack of jurisdiction defense. In fact, such evidence is 
only brought before this Court to engender prejudice against Rappleye. In any event, not 
only is Rappleye not appealing those findings, but for purposes of this appeal, Rappleye 
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does not dispute them. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING HODGES5 FIDELITY 
ACCOUNTS BECAUSE IT HAD NO JURISDICTION BECAUSE HODGES 
WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE ATTACHMENT PROCEEDING 
Johnson initially refutes Rappleye's jurisdiction defense by claiming that because 
Rappleye's arguments are unsupported, they are not sufficiently briefed. In support of this 
claim, Johnson relies on State of Utah v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145 (Utah App. 1997), State v 
Bishop. 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998) and Burns v. Summerhavs. 927 P.2d 197 (Utah App. 
1996). These cases, however, are clearly distinguishable.14 Further, Rappleye argued the 
merits of his jurisdiction defense in detail and with citations to the record in his Brief of 
Appellant. Accordingly, there is no legal basis for the Court to completely dismiss his 
jurisdiction defense without deciding said defense on the merits. 
Johnson further opposes Rappleye's jurisdiction defense (i.e. that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction over Hodges because she was not a party to the attachment proceeding 
below) by pointing to Hodges' involvement in said proceeding. Johnson attempts to 
14
 The Montoya court was faced with an inadequately briefed issue raised for the 
first time on appeal. Montoya, 937 P.2d at 150. The Bishop court was faced with an issue 
briefed by defendant "in a footnote." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 450. And, the Bums court was 
concerned with an appeal that did "not contain citations to the record showing that each of 
the issues he has raised was preserved for appeal in the trial court," that failed "to indicate 
the standard of review for each of the issues," failed to "provide any argument on [one] 
issue," and "[i]n his entire brief, Lawrence cites to only one authority, the Comment to Rule 
1.13 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and the "Scope" of these Rules, to support his 
assertions." Burns, 927 P.2d at 199. 
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discount the undisputed fact that Hodges was not a named party by claiming that Hodges sat 
at Rappleye's table during the March 6, 2002 attachment hearing, helped with exhibits at 
said hearing and testified at said hearing. Johnson even claims that the testimony of 
Hodges' son at the March 6th hearing somehow makes her a party. Notably, Johnson 
provides the Court no caselaw that appearing and testifying at a spouse's legal proceeding is 
equivalent to being a party to the same proceeding. 
To the contrary, Utah courts have required one to be a party if they are to be bound 
by a court's order. In Ostler v. Buhler. 989 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah 1999), the court held 
that, '"A decree in favor of a person who is not a party to the action or proceeding is void 
because the court has no jurisdiction to make it.'" (Citation omitted). In Snelson v. 
Pickard, 56 P. 89 (Utah 1899), the trial court ordered the defendant to turn over certain 
stock to a referee, in satisfaction of plaintiff s demand. Pursuant to an agreement of the 
parties, the defendant subsequently delivered said stock to plaintiffs attorney who disposed 
of the same. Thereafter defendant demanded the stock of the attorney, who refused to 
cooperate. The defendant then obtained an order to show cause against the attorney, but on 
appeal the Snelson court invalidated said order, holding that the attorney could not be held 
amenable to the trial court's order because the attorney was not a party. Li at 90. The 
defendant's only remedy against the attorney was a separate action for damages. IdL 
Accordingly, just because Hodges attended the various legal proceedings against 
Rappleye and provided testimony at said proceeding, the trial court does not somehow 
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obtain jurisdiction over her. She must be a party to establish jurisdiction. Thus, the trial 
court committed reversible error in adjudicating her assets in the Fidelity Investment 
accounts in the attachment proceeding below. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CALCULATION OF RAPPLEYE'S 
PERCENTAGE OF THE PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF THE RESORT 
Alternatively, should the Court enforce the trial court's judgment, the Court should 
correct the trial court's incorrect calculation of the sale proceeds from the Resort 
attributable to Rappleye. 
The trial court awarded Johnson 48.39 % of the $330,000 purchase price of the 
Resort. However, the trial court arrived at the 48.39% by dividing Rappleye's $144,000 
contribution by the $297,579.79 wired to purchase the Resort. As stated earlier, Johnson 
has provided no evidence that the $32,500 difference between the wired amount and the 
purchase amount was paid by Rappleye. It is certainly Johnson's burden to prove that the 
$32,500 came from Rappleye as it is her claim to prove her damages. In the Brief of 
Appellee, she states without citation to the record that: 
The evidence presented to the Trial Court showed that Rappleye and Hodges made 
every attempt to equally share the costs associated with the purchase of the Branson 
Property. It is certainly reasonable to assume that the additional amount of 
approximately $32,500 was also equally shared by Rappleye and Hodges. 
Imputing half of the remaining $32,500 to Rappleye is pure speculation, which should not 
be the basis of a court's damage award. Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, 808 P.2d 1069, 
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1079 (Utah 1991) (holding, "there still must be evidence that rises above speculation and 
provides a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages."). 
Accordingly, the trial court committed reversible error in calculating the percent of 
the $330,000 Resort purchase price that is attributable to Rappleye. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, the Court should reverse the trial court's conclusion that 
there was no fraudulent transfer and overturn any findings in support of said conclusion. 
The Court should base such a reversal on the statute of limitations or on jurisdictional 
grounds. Any of the trial court's findings of fact that conflict with such a conclusion of law 
(which are noted in the Statement of Facts section in the Brief of Appellant) are clearly 
erroneous. 
Finally, and in the alternative to a reversal of the trial court's decision, the Court 
should modify the trial court's incorrectly calculated judgment amount. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this u day of January, 2004. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
\Sjephen Quesenberry 
'T^Bryan Quesenberry 
Attorneys for Rappleye 
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APPENDIX A 
'•32,' [1207 SU.IUT 
QUIT CLAIM DEED a s , ^ 
W/*/i Statutory Acknowledgment VJSZ'Z-U H l ' l l 
THIS INDENTURE, Made on the.J2th.-day of September A D 
One Thousand Nine Hundred a n d . . n inet^ j -J±ree. by and between. i^or^e_£rxce 
_Rappleyea -a_roarried_perspn_ 
of the County of Taney
 t j n the State of Missouri, part_y_ of the first part, and j 
J^^^^J^^n^^^l^Y^j^^-^^FJ^^^I^I^PIl 
of -the County of !F^F^L , in the State of Missouri, part^i. of the second part 
WITNESSETH, That the said part.y of the first part in consideration of the sum of 
J![*QD§-§5£-2j^§^^ DO'LLARS 
I , 
to.-hi lU paid by the part_y. of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, 
do^s by these presents Remise, Release and forever Quit Claim unto the said party of the 
second part the following described lot, tracts, or parcels of land, lying, being and situate in the County of 
Taney
 t a n c j State of Missouri, to-wit* 
Al l of Lots One (1 ) , Two (2 ) , Three ( 3 ) , and Four (4) i n Block F i f ty -one (51) , and 
Lots Three (3) and Four (4) i n Block F o r t y - s i x (46) , and Lots Ten (10) and Eleven 
(11) i n Block Forty-one (41) a l l i n Rockaway Beach, as per t he recorded P l a t t h e r e o f 
f i l e d i n t h e Office of the Recorder of Deeds, Taney County, Missour i -
This Qui t Claim Deed i s being re - recorded t o add t h e following l e g a l d e s c r i p t i o n which 
was i n a d v e r t e n t l y de le ted from Quit Claim Deed recorded October 4, 1993, i n Book 322 
and Page 1207-1208. 
Also: Al l of Lot Ten (10) in Block For ty (40) i n t h e Subdivision of Rockaway Beach, 
Missouri as per the recorded p l a t thereof, Records of Taney County, Missour i . 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same with all rights, immunities, privileges and appurtenances there-
to belonging unto the said party of the second part and hex heirs and assigns for- \ 
ever, so that neither the said party of the first part nor h i s heirs, nor any other person | 
or persons for«him or in his name or behalf, shall or will hereafter claim or t 
demand any right or title to the aforesaid premises or any part thereof, but they, and every one of them shall 
by these presents be excluded and forever barred. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said party of the first part ha-S— - - ^ - hereunto-set—bis 
hand and seal the day and year first above written. ^ / / I , s, 
S.gned, Sealed o^§fyKge g^nce of C$%ggM^^ 
jLi^rj:c--.j^.ii_r_T: 21 L 2X— (SEAL) 
(SEAL) 
(SEAL) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) f iw i ^ i i - henrAkuo i ^ i / u m i f i i i ^ k i » . * 
County of 1 ! ss> SINGLE PERSON'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
On this day of , 19 before me personally appeared 
to me known to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledged that executed the same as free act and deed 
The said further declared to be single and unmarried 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, 
at my office in the day and year first above written. 
My term of office as a Notary Public will expire , 19 
(SEAL) Notary Public 
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APPENDIX B 
Mr. Checkett:15 
Rappleye: 
Mr. Checkett: 
Rappleye: 
Mr. Checkett: 
Rappleye: 
Mr. Checkett: 
Rappleye: 
* * * 
Mr. Checkett: 
Rappleye: 
Mr. Checkett: 
Rappleye: 
* * * 
Mr. Checkett: 
Rappleye: 
Mr. Checkett: 
Rappleye: 
* * * 
Mr. Checkett: 
Rappleye: 
Mr. Checkett: 
Rappleye: 
Mr. Checkett: 
Rappleye: 
* * * 
Mr. Checkett: 
Rappleye: 
So, for the last three years or so, have you ever lived in the 
Branson area? 
In the Branson area, yes. 
OK, where did you live? 
Rockaway Beach 
Alright, who did you live with in Rockaway Beach? 
Well, I was married and lived in Rockaway Beach. 
And who was your spouse? 
Jean Rappleye [i.e. Hodges] 
And is it true that Jean had a resort in Rockaway Beach? 
Yes. 
And you stayed at the Resort with Jean? 
Yes. 
And Jean recently sold that Resort. Did she not? 
I think she has. 
Did you have any money invested in the resort? 
I didn't have any interest in the resort. 
Now, were you married to Jean when she acquired that resort? 
yes. 
And who did she buy it from? 
Uh, I'm trying to think of the name. 
Well, does Duvall Michel Investments ring a bell? 
yes. 
And do you know the people the resort was recently sold 
to? . . . Does Emery or Sonya Smith ring a bell? 
Hum. It seems like that it was. 
15
 Mr. Checkett was Johnson's attorney at the February 1996 bankruptcy trial. 
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Thii instrument i s prepared byt 
Linda Jean Rappleye 
P.O. Box 86 
Rockawuy Beach, Hisuouri 65740 
(417) 561-4135 
#30,4,33 
Thio apace reserved for use 
by Clerk of Court: 
STATUTORY WARRANTY DEED 
X, Limla Jean Rappleye, whose post office address is P.O. Box B6, 
Rockaway Beach, Missouri 65740, hereinafter referred to as "th* Grantor", 
for good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is acknowledged, 
hereby grant, bargain, Mil, and convey to^Linda Hodgea, whose poat office 
address la P.O. Box 66, Rockaway Beach, Missouri 65740, hereinafter 
referred to as "the Grantee*" and the helra, assigns and successors of the 
Grantee foraver, all right, title interest, estate, lien/ claim, equity, 
and demand of the Grantor in and to the real property in Taney County, 
Miaaouri, described as: 
ALL Or LOTS ONE (1), TWO (2), THREE (3), AND FOUR (4) IN BLOCK 
F1FTY-ONE (51), AND LOTS THREE (3) AND FOUR (4) IN BLOCK 
FORTY-SIX (46), AND LOTS TEN (10) AND ELEVEN (11) IN BLOCK 
FORTY-ONE (41), LOT TEN (10) IN BLOCK F0R7Y (40) XN THE SUB-
DIVISION OF ROCKAWAY BEACH, MISSOURI AS PER THE RECORDED PLAT 
THEREOF, RECORDS OF TANEY COUNTY, MISSOURI. 
SUBJECT TO EASEMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS Or RECORD, IF ANY. 
The Grantor fully warrants the title to the above-described property 
and will defend the same against the lawful claims of all persons 
whomsoever« 
This Statutory warranty Deed is signed by the Grantor in the Presence 
of the witnesses of the JT* day of JXii^Juu^^^• 
WITNESSES: GRANTOR: 
Brandy/tU 
ciawes r. wcngis /
 y , 
L
^
s
 Brandy/O. Nichols 
Linda/Jean Rappleycr ' / 
0TJUT CHF MISSOURI 
Cdl/NT*..t)P/JTANEY 
f ™ i J^^gping inatrument was acknowladgad before me on the i_day or 
v&tc*Bfefyc l£s3 , by Linda Jean Rappleye, who personally appeared before m, 
i X ^ VAnnuii^rtA.i hhat *h».« executed the same as her free ac t and deed: 
/ ; 
